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Managerial Career Concerns and Risk Management
Jouahn Nam, Jun Wang and Ge Zhang∗
Abstract
We present a dynamic model of corporate risk management and managerial career
concerns. We show that managers with high (low) career concerns are more likely to
speculate (hedge) early in their careers. In the later stage of their careers when managers
have less career concerns, there is no speculative motive for self interested managers. On
the other hand, managers with minimal career concerns engage in neither hedging nor
speculation early in their careers, but they may choose to hedge after poor early perfor-
mance.
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1 Introduction
In a world with no friction such as the world in Modigliani and Miller (1958), one can use
an argument similar to the one concerning financing activities to show that risk management
does not change the value of the firm. Different financing activities only change the distrib-
ution of firm value among various claim holders but do not affect the total value of the firm.
Since shareholders of the firm can achieve their goal of reducing systematic risk by holding a
diversified portfolio, corporate risk management neither increases nor decreases shareholders’
welfare. If risk management bears a cost, it is a strictly value-reducing activity. Therefore, the
classical paradigm suggests that corporate managers should not engage in any risk manage-
ment activities at all.
The increasing use of derivatives by corporations contradicts this prediction suggested by
the classical paradigm. To find the reasons behind this increasing demand for risk management
products, economists have introduced several types of friction in order to model the world in
a more realistic way. The rationales for corporate risk management fall into two main para-
digms: shareholder wealth maximization and manager utility maximization. Three theories of
hedging have been advanced that are based on the shareholder wealth maximization paradigm
– the reduction in expected taxes theory, the reduction in the costs of financial distress theory
and the mitigation of the underinvestment problem theory.1 Empirical tests of these theories
have produced mixed results, but two theories – reduction in the costs of financial distress
theory and mitigation of the underinvestment problem theory – have received substantial sup-
port.2 Following the theory of manager wealth maximization, a manager has an incentive to
induce the firm to hedge more or less in order to maximize their own wealth.3 Several empiri-
1See Mayers and Smith (1982); Smith and Stulz (1985); Smith, Smithson, and Wilford (1990); and, Froot,
Scharfstein and Stein (1993).
2See Wall and Pringle (1988); Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993); Dolde (1995); Allayannis and Ofek
(2001); Berkman and Bradbury (1996); Mian (1996); Tufano (1996); Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997); Gay
and Nam (1998); and, Howton and Perfect (1998)
3See Smith and Stulz (1985), Breeden and Viswanathan (1998), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1995).
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cal studies, such as Tufano (1996), Gay and Nam (1998), Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002),
provide the supporting evidence.
While these studies have increased our understanding as to why or what motivates cor-
porations to manage risk, less attention has been directed to managerial career concerns as a
major determinant of firms risk management. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) and Breeden and
Viswanathan (1998) explore this connection between risk management and manager career
concern (or, compensation) using models in which shareholders learn about the quality of
a firms management by observing the firms operating performance. In these models man-
agers enhance the learning process by hedging those macroeconomic-related risks that are
considered outside their control. Risk management, therefore, reduces the noise contained in
earnings and thus increases their usefulness as indicators of managerial quality. Following this
line of reasoning, we provide a model for the self-interested manager, who is concerned about
his or her own career and compensation.
We here provide a dynamic model with two time periods, so that the time series properties
of corporate risk management activities can be derived. In our model, there exist good man-
agers and bad managers. The manager’s true ability is his or her own private information, and
the compensation contract is a short-term contract revised by the shareholders to reflect the
reputation of the manager at the time of revision. In this model, the firm also faces a takeover
threat by a corporate raider who is taking over firms with bad managers. Without knowing
the true type of the manager, the raider makes the takeover decision based on perceived man-
agerial reputation. Once the firm is taken over, the manager loses his or her job, future wage
income, and firm specific rent. In each period, there is a cash flow signal, which the manager
can manipulate through hedging or speculation. The action of hedging or speculation is a pri-
vate action conducted by the manager, not observable to the others, but rationally anticipated
by the shareholders and the corporate raider. If the raider takes over a firm after certain cash
flow realization, the manager will have the incentive for hedging or speculation to reduce the
probability of generating such cash flow.
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We contribute to the literature of corporate risk management by studying how managerial
career concerns at different career stages affect the activities of hedging and speculation. We
show that managers with some career concerns are likely to hedge early in their careers. Later
in their careers, their hedging activities decrease. This result is consistent with the empirical
evidence provided by Tufano (1996).
Our model also provide several new empirical predictions and most of them have not been
tested before. Because managers with high career concerns must produce really good results
to convince shareholders and outsiders of their quality, they are likely to speculate early in
their careers. Over time, since bad managers are more likely to lose their jobs, the pool of
surviving managers consists of more good managers. Managers have less career concerns,
and the speculative motive disappears.
The previous two results apply to managers who have some career concerns. However, we
show that managers with minimal career concerns engage in neither hedging nor speculation
early in their careers. These managers may only choose to hedge after poor early performance.
For these managers, the only time we may observe some hedging activities is after the firm’s
early results are bad.
Note that because we consider a dynamic two-period model, we can illustrate an explicit
time series pattern of hedging and speculation activities over managerial tenure. This feature
allow us to make richer predictions of corporate risk management than those single period
models. The other unique feature in our model is that we allow for speculation as one possible
strategy while most of the existing models (such as DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), Breeden and
Viswanathan (1998)) do not. When the manager prefers a spread-out cash flow distribution, he
or she can speculate in our model but can only choose not to hedge in theirs. Hence our model
can provide predictions on when managers may prefer to hedge and when they may prefer
to speculate. Knowing when managers may want to speculate can be useful to shareholders
and boards to either increase monitoring or design compensation mechanism to reduce the
incentive to speculate.
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This paper is organized as follows. We describe the framework and equilibrium in Section




We consider a two-period model with zero interest rate. All parties in the game are risk
neutral. The firm is managed by a manager. There are two types of managers in the world,
good managers (G) and bad managers (B). The manager knows his or her own type, but the
shareholders and the outsiders do not know the exact type of the manager. At the beginning of
the first period, they know that there is a probability of µ that the manager is a good manager.
In each period, the firm generates a cash flow. The cash flow in period k, Yk, takes one of the
three values, 0, 1, and 2. This cash flow is publicly observable. The probability distribution of
this cash flow signal Yk depends on the true ability of the manager and the risk management
action that the manager takes in this period. If the manager is good and does not take any
risk management action, the probability distribution of Yk taking value from states 0,1,2 is
represented by PN = (1−α− β ,β ,α), (0 < α ,β < 1). Thus, given a good manager who
does no hedge or speculate, the expected value of Yk is 2α+ β. If the manager is bad and
does not actively manage financial risks, the probability distribution of Yk is given by QN =
(α ,β ,1−α−β). The expected value of Yk under a bad manager is 2−2α−β.
In each period, the manager can hedge or speculate to alter the probability distribution of
the cash flow Yk. We refer risk management to both hedging and speculation. In keeping with
most models on corporate hedging, risk management is modeled as an action that changes the
variance of the cash flow distribution while preserving the mean of the cash flow. Hedging
reduces the variance of the cash flow while speculation increases the variance. Furthermore,
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the operational details of such activities are abstracted and it is assumed that the cash flow
Yk follows a new probability distribution with the same mean and smaller (larger) variance
when the manager hedges (speculates). In particular, if the manager is good, the distribution
of Yk is given by PH = (1−α−β− δ ,β+ 2δ ,α− δ), (δ > 0), if he or she hedges and PS =
(1−α−β+δ ,β−2δ ,α+δ) if he or she speculates. It can be easily verified that the expected
value of Yk remains the same, and the variance of Yk decreases after hedging and increases
after speculation. Similarly, if the manager is bad, the distribution of Yk is given by QH =
(α−δ ,β+2δ ,1−α−β−δ) if he or she hedges and QS = (α+δ ,β−2δ ,1−α−β+δ) if he
or she speculates. We make the following assumptions on α, β, and δ to ensure that a higher
cash flow always indicates a higher probability of a good manager than a lower cash flow.
α+β+δ < 1 (1)
2β+α > 1+2δ (2)
α−β > 2δ. (3)
Condition (1) ensures that the cash flow will fall into any one of three states with non-zero
probability no matter what action the manager takes. Conditions (2) and (3) allow the good
manager to always have larger probability to generate high cash flow: P(Yk = 2)>P(Yk = 1)>
P(Yk = 0). The opposite is true for the bad manager: Q(Yk = 2) < Q(Yk = 1) < Q(Yk = 0).
Let Pi(m)(Q j(m)) represent the probability of the good (bad) manager generating cash flow
m using strategy i( j) where i( j) may be hedging (H), speculation (S), or no action (N). By
making the above assumptions, the monotone likelihood ratio property (see Milgrom, 1981)
is satisfied for the probability distributions of cash flows. That is, no matter what risk manage-
ment activity each type of manager takes, the probability ratio, P(Yk)/Q(Yk), increases with






Q j(2) , (i, j) ∈ {(N,H,S)× (N,H,S)} (4)
Given this setup, the manager can achieve the purpose of hedging or speculation by hav-
ing the appropriate probability distribution of cash flow. The specific action that the manager
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needs to take to induce such a distribution is not modeled here, but with the plethora of new fi-
nancial markets, derivative products, and other financial innovations, the manager can achieve
a wide range of value-neutral risk shifts through financial contracting. By modeling the risk
management action at the level of its outcome, namely the distribution of cash flow, the key
insight of risk management – value neutral shifts of risk – is captured while the operational
details are abstracted.
There exists a fixed cost for doing risk management, c. This cost, similar to a transaction
cost, may include brokerage fees and commissions that the manager has to pay to enter into
financial contracts. It may also be the opportunity cost that the manager incurs when he or she
devotes time and energy to understanding financial markets and finding the right combination
of financial instruments in order to achieve the desired risk profile. This cost is not the price
that the manager pays for the financial contracts. Because the expected value of firm cash flow
stays the same after risk management, the price for these financial contracts should be zero
in a risk-neutral and frictionless world. Therefore, this fixed cost for hedging and speculating
should be considered as a form of transaction cost.
As first shown by Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), when a long-term contract be-
tween the manager and the owner/shareholders is not feasible, the manager and the owner ne-
gotiate the managers compensation contract in each period so that the manager is paid based
on his or her reputation at the time of contracting. In particular, it is assumed that the man-
ager is paid three times in this game for his or her service: at the beginning of the first period
(W0), at the beginning of the second period (W1 ), and at the end of the game (W2). The first
two payments are the wages for the two periods. The last payment can be considered as a
bonus or the future wage that the manager could have earned had there been one more period.
The shareholders can observe the cash flows in the two periods but not the risk management
actions. They infer the reputation of the manager from the cash flow generated by the firm
6
in each period and make their conjectures about risk management activities. The payment
follows the formula
Wk = γProb(manager is good|Ik) (5)
where γ is a coefficient that maps managerial reputation to compensation, and Ik is the infor-
mation set of the shareholders at time k. If the wages of bad managers are normalized to zero
and the marginal productivity of good managers are assumed to be γ, then the optimal wage
that the owner is willing to pay a manager is γ multiplied by the managerial reputation as long
as the managerial labor market is competitive.
Note that Y1 and Y2 represent the firm cash flow in the first period and the second period.
The information set at time 0 is simply the prior probability of a good manager, µ. The infor-
mation set at time 1 contains the prior probability, the first period cash flow, and the conjecture
on the risk management action the manager takes in the first period. The information set at
time 2 contains the information set at time 1, the second period cash flow, and the conjecture
on the risk management action in the second period. Specifically,
I0 = [0,1]
I1 = I0×{0,1,2}×Θ
I2 = I1×{0,1,2}×Θ×Θ×Θ (6)
where Θ = {N,H,S}×{N,H,S} is the risk management action set available to two types of
managers. Notice that I2 contains the cross product of three Θ sets which correspond to the
risk management action that the manager can take in the second period when the first period
cash flow Y1 is 0, 1, and 2.
There is a corporate raider who also observes the firm cash flows and decides whether to
take over the firm at the end of each period. The raider has an alternative manager whose
ability ξ is known to the raider. Assuming there is no hold-out problem, the raider can take
over the firm by paying the shareholders the firm value under the current manager. Since good
managers generate higher values to the owner, the raider will take over the firm if and only
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if the reputation, i.e. the probability of being good, of the current manager is less than the
reputation of the alternative manager, ξ. After takeover, the raider fires the old manager and
employs the alternative manager. In addition, it is assumed that there is a limited number of
projects available so that the manager, who loses his or her job from takeover, does not find
another job and receives no future income. In other words, if the firm is taken over at the end
of the first period, the manager loses two payments, W1 and W2. If the firm is taken over at the
end of the second period, the manager loses the final payment W2. This is consistent with the
empirical evidence of Agrawal and Walkling (1994), who show that target firm managers are
more likely to lose their jobs after takeover and generally remain jobless for the following three
years. The information sets of the corporate raider are the same as those of the shareholders.
Figure 1 is an illustration of the time line of this game.
2.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept used is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991). The shareholders and the corporate raider conjecture the risk management activities
of the manager and update the probability of a good manager based on Bayes rule. The
payments to the manager depend on this revised probability, as do the takeover activities.
On the equilibrium path, the conjecture on the risk management action of the manager is
consistent with the actual strategy the manager is playing. The manager chooses his or her
optimal risk management strategy based on the equilibrium strategies of the shareholders and
the corporate raider.
Clearly, the probability of a good manager at information set I0 is the prior probability µ.
If the period 1 cash flow Y1 is m, m ∈ {0,1,2} and the conjectured risk management action
a1(b1) that a good (bad) type of manager takes is i( j), where i and j belong to Θ = {N,H,S},
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the probability of a good manager at time 1 given cash flow m, pi1(m), can be computed from
the Bayes rule,
pi1(a1 = i,b1 = j,Y1 = m) = µP
i(m)
µPi(m)+(1−µ)Q j(m) . (7)
In the same way, the probability of a good manager at the end of period 2, pi2, is determined
from period 1 cash flow, period 2 cash flow, and the conjectured risk management action
in the second period for the particular Y1. In the second period, the prior is pi1(m) and the
risk management action can be different for different realizations of period 1 cash flow. Let
pi2(i, j,m, i′, j′,m′) be the posterior probability of a good manager given that the first period
cash flow Y1 =m, conjectured first period risk management action a1 = i,b1 = j, second period
cash flow Y2 =m′, and conjectured second period risk management action a2(m) = i′,b2(m) =
j′.
pi2(i, j,m, i′, j′,m′) = pi1(i, j,m)P
i′(m′)
pi1(, i, j,m)Pi′(m′)+(1−pi1(i, j,m))Q j′(m′) . (8)
Note that the posterior probability is a monotone increasing function of the probability
ratio (P(m)/Q(m)). This ratio is always assumed to be bigger if the realized cash flow is
higher, regardless of the risk management activities. In this way, the higher realization always
contains more positive information which is consistent with the common sense of the financial
industry. This assumption also allows for exclusion of those non-intuitive equilibria where
higher cash flow is considered a signal of bad management and where the manager is punished
for generating a high cash flow.
The corporate raider makes a takeover attempt only if the reputation of the manager is
lower than that of the alternative manager. Since the raider has the same information as the
shareholders, the managers reputation is pi and takeover occurs if pi < ξ.
The managers total payoff is the sum of W0, W1, and W2. Because of the possible takeover,
the manager does not always receive all three payments. The payment at time 0, W0, is deter-
mined solely by prior probability and does not change with the risk management action the
manager takes; therefore, it will no longer be included in the managers payoff function. The
strategy space of the manager is Ω = Θ×Θ×Θ×Θ, where the first Θ = {N,H,S} is the
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action choice set in the first period and the next three are the second period strategy sets cor-
responding to the three realizations of the first period cash flow. Furthermore, the belief of the
shareholders and the raider are simplified as (pi1(a1,b1), pi2(a2(0),b2(0)), pi2(a2(1),b2(1)),
pi2(a2(2),b2(2))) where pi1(a1,b1) is the probability distribution of a good manager at time 1,
given that a good manager takes risk management action a1 and a bad manager takes action
b1. pi2(a2(m),b2(m)), m ∈ {0,1,2}, represents the probability distribution of a good manager
when the managers of the two types take first period actions a1 and b1, the first period cash
flow Y1 is m, and the managers take second period actions a2(m) and b2(m). Let
pi2(a2(m),b2(m)) = {pi2(a2(m),b2(m),0),pi2(a2(m),b2(m),1),pi2(a2(m),b2(m),2)}, (9)
where pi2(a2(m),b2(m), l) is the posterior probability of the manager being good given second
period cash flow l. Hence, given such a belief of the shareholders, the expected payoff of a
good manager at the time when he or she takes risk management action s2(m) in the second
period is
UG2 (m,s2(m)) = ∑2l=0 Ps2(m)(l)γpi2(a2(m),b2(m), l)I(pi2(a2(m),b2(m), l)≥ ξ)
− cI(s2(m) 6= N) (10)
where I(·) is the indicator function which equals 1 if the condition in the parenthesis is true and
0 if false. The intuition for this payoff is straightforward. γpi2(a2(m),b2(m), l) is the payment
at time 2 and Ps2(m)(l) is the probability of arriving at state l given the risk management
strategy s2(m). The manager does not receive this payment if the conjectured probability of a
good manager at this state does not exceed the takeover hurdle, in which case the firm is taken
over by the raider. The last term is the cost of risk management which is not incurred if the
strategy is no action.
With the expected payoff of period 2 computed for all possible realizations of Y1, we can
determine the total expected payoff of a good manager who chooses period 1 risk management





Ps1(l)[γpi1(a1,b1, l)+UG2 (l,s2(l))]I(pi1(a1,b1, l)≥ ξ)− cI(s1 6= N) (11)
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Note that when the time 1 probability of a good manager is smaller than the takeover
hurdle ξ, the firm is taken over by the raider at time 1, and the manager loses both time 1
payment W1 and future payoff UG2 (l,s2(l)).
In the same way, the payoff of a bad manager in the second period is denoted as UB2 (m,s2(m))
and the total payoff of a bad manager as UB1 (s1,s2), in particular,
UB2 (m,s2(m)) = ∑2l=0 Qs2(m)(l)γpi2(a2(m),b2(m), l)I(pi2(a2(m),b2(m), l)≥ ξ)





Qs1(l)[γpi1(a1,b1, l)+UB2 (l,s2(l))]I(pi1(a1,b1, l)≥ ξ)− cI(s1 6= N) (13)
Definition of Equilibrium: The following strategies and beliefs form a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium in this game:
• The belief of the shareholders and the corporate raider is that the good manager takes
risk management action a1 in the first period and a2 = (a2(0),a2(1),a2(2)) in the second
period corresponding to different Y1. The bad manager takes risk management action b1
in the first period and b2 = (b2(0),b2(1),b2(2)) in the second period corresponding to
different Y1.
• The strategy of the shareholders is to pay the manager γpi1(a1,b1,m) at time 1 if the
firm has not been taken over and if Y1 equals m. At time 2, the manager is paid
γpi2(a1,b1,m,a2(m),b2(m),m′) if the firm has not been taken over and if Y1 equals m
and Y2 equals m′. The strategy of the raider is to take over the firm whenever pi is less
than ξ and to do nothing otherwise.
• The strategy of the good manager is (sG1 ,sG2 ) which generates the maximum payoff,
given the strategies of the shareholders and the raider. The strategy of the bad manager











2 (m)) = max
s2∈{N,H,S}
UG2 (m,s2), m ∈ {0,1,2} (15)
UB1 (sB1 ,sB2 ) = max
(s1,s2)∈Ω
UB1 (s1,s2) (16)
UB2 (m,sB2 (m)) = max
s2∈{N,H,S}
UB2 (m,s2), m ∈ {0,1,2} (17)
• The strategies chosen by the managers are consistent with the belief of the shareholders
and the corporate raider, i.e. sG1 = a1, sB1 = b1, sG2 (m) = a2(m), and sB2 (m) = b2(m) for
all m ∈ {0,1,2} such that pi1(a1,b1,m)≥ ξ.
3 Analysis
This game is fairly complicated and the main goal is to show that there exist equilibria such
that the manager may hedge or speculate early in his or her tenure while choosing no action
late in his or her tenure. To illustrate the existence of such equilibrium, we choose a base set
of parameters as α = 0.55, β = 0.35, δ = 0.05, ξ = 0.5, γ = 10.4 Based on these parameter
values, the expected cash flow by a good manager is 1.45, and the expected cash flow by a
bad manager is 0.55. In this paper, the focus is on risk management activities such as buying
and selling futures or forwards, which have the characteristics of simultaneously reducing
or increasing the probability weights at both tails of distribution. The other commonly used
risk management vehicles are options, which usually affect one tail of the distribution while
changing the skewness of the distribution to preserve the mean. Options are not considered
here because the three-state distribution is not rich enough to model options in a meaningful
way and because the insight that can be drawn from futures/forwards contracts can also be
applicable to the usage of options.
First we investigate the effects of the prior probability of a good manager and the cost of
doing risk management on risk management choices. The prior probability of a good manager
4Our results are robust with variation of these parameters. We get the same results with other parameter
values.
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is the initial reputation of the manager, and the posterior probability is the revised reputation
of the manager after he or she manages the firm for some time and the firm performance under
his or her management is available.
Two cases are of less interest. One is when the cost of risk management is so high that it
is never optimal to engage in any risk management activities. Since the gain to the manager
comes from the change of the cash flow distribution and the change of expected payoff, this
gain can be less than the cost if the cost is sufficiently high. The other case occurs when the
initial reputation of the manager is so low that the raider always takes over the firm at time 1
regardless of the cash flow signal since the revised reputation is low enough to justify such a
takeover. In these two cases, the risk management activities have no effect on the outcome of
the game. In this model, we direct our focus toward the case where risk management activities
do make a difference. In other word, risk management cost is not too high and the initial
reputation of the manager is not too low.
We identify an equilibrium for a specific set of parameter values by the following steps.
First we conjecture a set of strategies for managers of two types. Then we verify that this set of
strategies are indeed optimal for managers if shareholders and raiders believe the same. If we
can show optimality for managers, then we find an equilibrium. Otherwise, this equilibrium
does not exist for this set of parameter values. By varying the initial reputation of the manager
(µ) and the cost of risk management (c), we are able to identify different equilibria for different
parameters.
3.1 High managerial career concerns
The first result is that for a certain range of managerial reputation, there exist equilibria that
both types of managers choose speculation in the first period and the raider takes over the firm
at time 1 if the cash flow realization is 0 or 1. Hence managers have very high career concerns
in this case because of the high takeover threat. If the period 1 cash flow is 2, the two types of
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managers may choose hedging, or no action in the second period depending on the cost and
the reputation.
Result 1: There exist equilibria with the following characteristics:
• The shareholders and the raider believe that both types of managers speculate in the first
period. If the period 1 cash flow is 2, both types of managers may hedge or take no risk
management action in the second period depending on the parameterization.
• The raider takes over the firm if period 1 cash flow Y1 is less than 2 at time 1. If Y1 = 2,
the raider does not attempt a takeover at time 1 and makes the period 2 takeover decision
based on the new reputation. The shareholders pay the manager pi1(S,S,2) at time 1 if
Y1 = 2 and accordingly at time 2.
• Both types of managers speculate in the first period. In the second period, the manager
of either type may hedge or choose no action depending on the parameterization.
Figure 2 illustrates the region of reputation and cost combination where two such equilibria
exist. Equilibrium I and Equilibrium II, share two common characteristics: both types of
managers speculate in the first period, and the raider takes over the firm if period 1 cash flow
Y1 is not 2, the highest possible realization. The main difference between these equilibria is
the actions taken in the second period. In Equilibrium I, both types of managers hedge in the
second period, while both do not take any action in Equilibrium II.
Both equilibria exist when initial reputation of the manager is not very high, (less than
0.5 in Figure 2). The firm being taken over in the first period is the most costly to managers.
After early takeover, managers lose income in both periods. Thus they would do whatever to
reduce the probability of an early takeover. When the initial reputation is not very high, the
raider will take over the firm unless there is superior performance. In this case, managers have
high career concerns, and these concerns drives managers of both types to speculate in order
to boost the probability of superior performance. Hence both types of managers speculate in
a large range of parameter values.
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The cost of hedging and speculation has a stronger effect on managerial action in the
second period. As shown in Figure 2, when the cost is close to zero, both types of managers
engage in hedging activity in the second period. This preference of active risk management to
passive risk management is not surprising at low transaction costs. The payoff of the manager





Probs2(l)γpi2(a2,b2, l)I(pi2(a2,b2, l)≥ ξ)− cI(s2 6= N) (18)
When c is close to zero, the payoff is the expected payment minus takeover loss at time 2. If
the net effect of the shareholders payment and the raiders takeover threat is that cash flows
at the center of the distribution are preferred to cash flows in both tails of the distribution,
the manager has an incentive to hedge. Otherwise, the incentive for speculation is high. As
no action generates a distribution that is between the distributions generated by hedging and
by speculation, with risk management cost almost zero, the strategy of no action can only
be optimal in very special cases. This is why the exclusion of speculation by Breeden and
Viswanathan (1998) may impose a large bias on their results.
When the transaction cost of no action is greater than zero, the passive strategy of no action
can become optimal in the second period. In Equilibrium II, both types prefer the no-action
strategy. Note that the time series pattern of managerial risk management behavior of this
equilibrium is that managers speculates early in their career and takes no action later. The
intuition is that taking action in the first period affects the total payoff of the manager more
than the action in the second period. In this equilibrium, if the first period cash flow is not 2,
the manager loses both W1 and W2. If there is a takeover in the second period, the manager
only loses W2. Hence, the gain from avoiding takeover in the first period is higher than the gain
from avoiding takeover in the second period. If the transaction cost of hedging or speculation
is greater than the gain in the second period but less than the gain in the first period, there exist
equilibria where the managers speculate in the first period but take no action in the second
period. The fact that the manager loses all future payoff if he or her does not build an early
reputation to avoid takeover is the key to the existence of such equilibria. In these equilibria,
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if one investigates the relation between risk management activities and managerial tenure, one
would find that new managers are more likely to speculate than old managers.
3.2 Medium managerial career concerns
When the initial managerial reputation increases, the raider may not want to take over the firm
if the first period cash flow is medium. The raider may still be able justify a takeover when
the first period cash flow is low. In this case, managers still have some career concerns, and
both the good manager and the bad manager have incentive to hedge in order to reduce the
probability of ending up with low first period cash flow. Our next result shows that there exist
such equilibria.
Result 2: There exist equilibria with the following characteristics:
• The shareholders and the raider believe that both types of managers hedge in the first
period. If the period 1 cash flow is 1 or 2, both types of managers may hedge or take no
risk management action in the second period depending on the parameterization.
• The raider takes over the firm if period 1 cash flow Y1 is 0 at time 1. If Y1 is 1 or 2, the
raider does not attempt a takeover at time 1 and makes the period 2 takeover decision
based on the new reputation. The shareholders pay the manager pi1(S,S, i) at time 1 if
Y1 = i, i ∈ {1,2} and accordingly at time 2.
• Both types of managers hedge in the first period. In the second period, the manager of
either type may hedge or choose no action depending on the parameterization.
Figure 2 illustrates the region of reputation and cost combination where two such equilib-
ria, Equilibrium III and Equilibrium IV, exist. In these two equilibria, managers have higher
initial reputation and lower career concerns than managers in Equilibria I and II. Hence, both
types of managers hedge the first period, and the raider takes over the firm if period 1 cash
flow Y1 is 0, the lowest possible realization. The main difference between these equilibria is
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the actions taken in the second period. In Equilibrium III, both types of managers hedge in the
second period after all cash flow realizations. In Equilibrium IV, no manager takes any action
in the second period. The key factor that differentiates Equilibrium III and Equilibrium IV is
again the cost of hedging and speculation. With this cost extremely low, managers engage in
hedging activities all the time. With moderately high cost, managers may choose no action in
the second period.
Note that in Equilibrium IV, the managers are observed to be engaged in hedging activities
in the first period but not in the second period. Tufano (1996) documents such a negative
correlation between hedging activities and managerial tenure in the gold mining industry. Our
results support Tufano’s (1996) empirical finding.
3.3 Minimal managerial career concerns
If the initial reputation of the manager is really high, the raider may not mount a takeover
attempt for any period 1 cash flow realization. Instead, the raider may need two consecutive
bad cash flows to justify a takeover. In other words, managers have minimal career concerns.
If this is the case, the manager becomes particularly concerned when the first period cash flow
is the worst and consequently have a strong incentive to hedge in the second period if Y1 = 0.
Indeed, such an equilibrium exists.
Result 3: There exists an equilibrium with the following characteristics:
• The shareholders and the raider believe that both types of managers take no action in the
first period. If the period 1 cash flow is 1 or 2, both types of managers take no action
again in the second period. If the period 1 cash flow is 0, both types of managers hedge
in the second period.
• The raider does not take over the firm at time 1. At time 2, the raider takes over the
firm when both cash flow realizations are 0 and does not take over in other states. The
17
shareholders pay the manager pi1(N,N,0) or pi1(N,N,2) at time 1 if Y1 equals 1 or 2 and
accordingly at time 2.
• Both types of managers adopt the passive strategy of no action in the first period. In the
second period, both types hedge in the second period if Y1=0 and take no action in other
states.
Figure 3 shows the existence of such an equilibrium (Equilibrium V) for combinations of
risk management cost and initial reputation. Note that the initial reputation for such an equi-
librium to exist is quite high: the prior probability of a good manager is over 0.95. Managers
in this case have minimal career concerns. Their only worry about being fired is after two
consecutive bad performances. The other interesting point is that such an equilibrium exists
for a non-zero but not too high transaction cost. If the cost is zero, the manager may engage in
some risk management activity in the first period and other states of the second period for the
reason previously given. As no action introduces a probability distribution that is less spread-
out than the distribution from speculation but more so than the one from hedging, it is quite
unlikely that no action would provide the maximum expected payoff to the manager when the
cost of hedging and speculation is none. If the cost is too high, the gain from hedging may not
be enough to cover the cost.
Contrary to the other equilibria discussed previously, the correlation between managerial
risk management activities and tenure in this equilibrium is positive. This phenomenon occurs
when the initial reputation of the manager is very high and there is some moderate cost of
doing risk management.
3.4 Varying other parameters
In the analysis so far, the reputation of the alternative manager and the coefficient of man-
agerial payment are fixed. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4 show how changes of the reputation
of the alternative manager affect the equilibria in Result 1 and Result 2. This reputation, ξ,
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determines when the raider takes over the firm. The higher ξ is, the more likely the raider is
to make a takeover attempt. Hence, it is not surprising to see that the equilibria in Result 1 ex-
ist in a region with higher initial managerial reputation when the reputation of the alternative
manager is higher. Higher initial reputation generates higher posterior probability, and this
offsets the higher takeover hurdle to keep the behavior of the raider the same. The effect ξ on
the equilibria in Result 2, Equilibria III and IV, is similar. In general there is a shift toward
high initial reputation when the reputation of the alternative manager is higher.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 4 shows the effects of changing the payment coefficient γ on
the equilibria in Results 1 and 2. The payment coefficient, γ, can be considered as the marginal
amount that shareholders pay a good manager over a bad manager or the wage difference be-
tween a good manager and a bad manager in a competitive managerial labor market. When the
coefficient γ is increased (Figure 3 Panel (d)), the wage difference is higher and the manager
gains more for an increase of reputation. In addition, the opportunity cost to the manager when
the firm is taken over rises with γ, too. Hence the benefit of doing risk management is higher,
and the region for these equilibria when both types engage in hedging activities in the second
period increases. The equilibria where managers take some actions in both periods exist at
some cost levels that would not support such equilibria if the coefficient γ had been lower. In
this sense, an increase of payment coefficient is equivalent to a decrease of risk management
cost. The determinant of whether to take some activities is the ratio of cost and benefit. For
the same reason, the equilibrium where both types take no action in the second period exist at
a higher cost when γ is larger. On the other hand, if the payment coefficient is smaller, all the
equilibria occur at lower cost levels as shown in Figure 3, Panel (c).
Figure 5 shows the effect of varying the reputation of the alternative manager and the
compensation coefficient on Equilibrium V, where both types of managers take no action early
on and only hedge after an initial bad realization. In general, high reputation of the alternation
manager increase the region that supports this equilibrium, so does high payment coefficient.
Both effects are driven by the same intuition. High reputation of the alternative manager and
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high payoff coefficient both increase the expected cost of the manager when the raider takes
over the firm after two consecutive bad draws. In the case of high reputation of the alternative
manager, a large set of initial reputation will result in a takeover after two bad draws. Thus
the probability of getting takeover is higher. In the case of high payment coefficient, the
opportunity cost of takeover is high. Both effects motivate the manager to adopt hedging
strategy in a large area of initial reputation and cost combinations.
4 Discussion
As shown in Result 1 and Result 2, for a wide range of parameters, there exist equilibria where
the managers speculate or hedge in the first period but not in the second period. In other words,
scenarios have been shown in which managers engage in some activities early in their careers.
The first reason is that the takeover threat is higher early on because the ability of the manager
is unknown and a bad realization can be a signal of low ability. The other reason is that the loss
from being taken over is higher early on simply because the new manager has more to lose
if he or she is considered a “bad” type early in his or her career. These two reasons together
create strong incentives for managers, both good and bad, to hedge or speculate early in their
careers to manipulate the signals they are sending. Those managers that survive the takeover
in the first period have higher reputations and thus are less concerned about the takeover threat.
The loss from being taken over in the second period is also smaller. In general, the incentive
for speculation disappear for older managers who have built their reputations.
Corporate takeover is a way to weed out the bad managers from the existing pool of
managers. Other managerial disciplinary mechanisms, such as the board of directors firing
underperforming managers, serve the same purpose. The essence is that these disciplinary
mechanisms put a higher cost on new managers than on old managers. Hence new managers
are willing to do more, in this case engage in hedging or speculation activities, to avoid this
type of disciplinary action. The managerial labor market also causes new managers to be more
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concerned about their reputations since reputations not only affect current wages but also fu-
ture wages. Overall, building an early reputation and avoiding managerial discipline are the
main driving forces causing managers to hedge or speculate early in their careers.
The equilibrium in Result 3 is also interesting as it produces an opposite time series pat-
tern of risk management versus managerial tenure. The intuition is that the manager starts
with a really high reputation and knows that he or she can continue to the second period with
certainty. The only time that the manager faces takeover is when the firm produces two con-
secutive negative outcomes. To avoid this, the manager, good or bad, can either hedge in the
first period to reduce the probability of having lowest cash flow at time 1, or hedge in the
second period if the first outcome turns out to be low. The latter strategy is more cost effective
as the manager bears the hedging cost only when Y1 is 0, the probability of which is quite low.
Hence, given that there is a cost of risk management and the initial reputation of the manager
is very high, there is an equilibrium that both types of managers hedge in the second period if
the first period cash flow is low and take no action in all other cases.
The transaction cost of risk management plays an important role in this analysis. If there is
no such transaction cost, the managers almost always choose active strategies of either hedg-
ing or speculation. This is not surprising as the strategy of no action induces a distribution
that is less centered than the distribution from hedging and less spread-out than the one from
speculation. Without considering transaction cost, this passive strategy of no action is not
likely to be the optimal strategy. Only when there is some cost in doing risk management, do
equilibria where managers may take no action emerge. In practice, cost is a serious concern in
making risk management decisions. Empirically, the one firm characteristic with the strongest
effect on risk management activities that has been documented so far is firm size, which sug-
gests an economy of scale effect on the risk management operation. Therefore, cost deserves
appropriate attention in explaining corporate risk management activities.
Our model provides a number of interesting predictions between managerial career con-
cerns and risk management activities. The first one is that managers with moderate career
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concerns tend to do hedging early in their careers and this is confirmed by Tufano (1996). In
addition, we also show that there is also a cross sectional effect of this pattern. This pattern
should be most pronounced in firms with medium cost of doing risk management. Managers
in firms with very low cost may be engaging in risk management all the time, while managers
in firms with very high cost may never hedge. If firm size is a proxy for the cost of risk man-
agement, then we may most likely find this relation between risk management activities and
CEO tenure in mid-sized firms.
The behavior of managers with high career concerns and minimal career concerns is dif-
ferent. We show that managers with high career concerns may speculate early in their careers
but may choose to hedge or take no action later in their careers. If speculation is against the
interests of shareholders, it is important to identify situations where managers may have the
incentive to speculate. Then corporate board can either increase monitoring effort or design
other mechanism to reduce the manager’s speculative incentive. We also show that “superstar”
managers may not hedge or speculate right after they become top managers. However, these
“superstar” managers may start hedging after an early bad performance.
Additional empirical predictions come from our results by varying the reputation of the
alternative manager and the compensation coefficient. The reputation of the alternative man-
ager can be considered as an indication of the competition of the managerial labor market.
In an industry with relatively low managerial special knowhow, it will be easy to bring in an
outsider to do a reasonable job. In our model, such industry has high reputation of the alter-
native manager, and we predict that managers in such industry may engage in either hedg-
ing or speculation more than managers in industry where the managerial knowhow is high.
The compensation coefficient can be related to managerial compensation directly. Hence our
model predicts that managers who are highly compensated may be more likely to take actions
than these who are not.
Finally, in this model, we have avoided operational details on how to manage risk and
which financial contracts to use for the desired risk profile. However, the distributions from
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hedging and speculation in the analysis can be achieved through trading in futures/forwards
contracts. The other financial contracts widely available are options. It is important to recog-
nize that neither trading futures nor trading options should change the mean of firm cash flow.
The change happens to the variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the cash flow; in other words,
the second and higher moments of the cash flow distribution are changed by risk management.
Futures cause the distribution to contract or expand symmetrically across the center of the
distribution while options skew the distribution toward one tail. However, the basic idea of
this model would not change if options were explicitly allowed in the strategy space of the
manager. The incentive for managing risk is generally higher in the early stage of a managers
tenure than it is when the manager has been in office for some time. With some transaction
costs, managers may hedge or speculate more early in their tenures than they do late in their
tenures.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, risk management is modeled as a private action of the manager to change the
probability distribution of firm cash flows. Both hedge and speculation are allowed as possible
risk management strategies. In a dynamic model, managers have incentives to engage in risk
management activities in order to manipulate the signals they send to the public. Furthermore,
for a wide range of parameter values, there exist equilibria where managers hedge or speculate
early in their tenures and take no action late in their tenures. The intuition for this time series
pattern of risk management behavior is that managers generally benefit more by being active
early and the loss from not taking actions is also higher early in their tenures. Both contribute
to a higher incentive to hedge or speculate early.
When the manager has a really high initial reputation, he or she may defer the decision
of risk management to a later period so that the manager only needs to hedge if he or she
is unlucky and receives a bad draw early in the career. The insight is that the high initial
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reputation shields the manager from corporate discipline if he or she produces just one bad
signal. Hence, the manager can defer the risk management decision after the early information
is released, and only needs to hedge when the early information is unfavorable to him or
her. This risk management strategy is more cost effective than doing risk management at the
beginning of managerial tenure.
The motivation for risk management and the practice of risk management are still not
clear to financial economists. In the paper, we provide one more rationale for corporate risk
management from a managerial self interest point of view. We also provide an explanation
for Tufano’s (1996) empirical finding, that the correlation between risk management activities
and managerial tenure is negative. Transaction costs of risk management has been shown to
play an important role in corporate decision making, a fact which has been largely overlooked
in the current literature of risk management.
Other questions that can be addressed include the issue of microhedge versus macrohedge
and the design of an optimal managerial compensation mechanism when managers have ac-
cess to the financial markets for managing risks. While academics unanimously favor macro-
hedge or firm level risk management, the accounting rules tend to favor microhedge or trans-
action level hedge. How the current accounting rules affect corporate risk management and
risk control is an important question to be investigated and is closely related to the managerial
compensation issue. It is also important for shareholders and boards of directors to evaluate
the effect of risk management opportunities on current managerial compensation and to design
optimal mechanisms to benefit from corporate risk management activities.
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Figure 1. Time line of the game.












Figure 2. Equilibria when initial managerial reputation µ is between 0.2 and 0.95. In 
equilibrium I, both managers  speculate in the first period and hedges in the second 
period when Y1 is 2. In equilibrium II, both managers  speculate in the first period and 
do not take risk management action in the second period when Y1 is 2. In equilibrium 
III, both managers  hedge in the first period and hedges in the second period when Y1 is 
1 or 2. In equilibrium IV, both managers  hedge in the first period and do not take risk 
management action in the second period when Y1 is 0 or  2. Other parameters used are: α=0.55, β=0.35, δ=0.05, ξ=0.5, γ=10.











Figure 3. Equilibria when initial managerial reputation µ is extremely high (between 
0.95 and 0.95). In equilibrium V, both managers  take no risk management action in the 
first period and in the second period if Y1 is 1 or 2, and hedge in the second period only 
when Y1 is 0. The parameters used are: α=0.55, β=0.35, δ=0.05, ξ=0.5, γ=10. 




























Figure 4. Equilibria when initial managerial reputation µ is between 0.2 and 0.95 under 
alternative conditions. In equilibrium I, both managers  speculate in the first period and 
hedges in the second period when Y1 is 2. In equilibrium II, both managers  speculate in 
the first period and do not take risk management action in the second period when Y1 is 
2. In equilibrium III, both managers  hedge in the first period and hedges in the second 
period when Y1 is 1 or 2. In equilibrium IV, both managers  hedge in the first period and 
do not take risk management action in the second period when Y1 is 0 or  2. The base 
set of parameters used are: α=0.55, β=0.35, δ=0.05, ξ=0.5, γ=10. Each panel has one 


























Figure 5. Equilibria when initial managerial reputation µ is extremely high (between 
0.95 and 0.95) under alternative conditions. In equilibrium V, both managers  take no 
risk management action in the first period and in the second period if Y1 is 1 or 2, and 
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